In the latest instalment of Inchcape and Ambrey’s Global Shipping Report we explore key developments in maritime security and global trade, including an analysis of pirate events and the kidnapping for ransom cycle off West Africa, Black Sea war risks, the impact of humanitarian Search & Rescue on merchant vessels, an analysis of global seaborne trade and impacts, as well as the Middle East situation. Contributors include Sub-Saharan Africa analyst Rebecca Egan, senior analyst for Europe and the Americas Thomas Alexa and Daniel Mueller, senior analyst for the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, all of Ambrey, and Ian Wilkinson, vice president for sales excellence at Inchcape.
Gulf of Guinea pirate activity
Two important maritime security (marsec) events occurred in Q2 in the Gulf of Guinea.
On 21 April, the Sea Panther heading for Douala (Cameroon) was approached by four suspects on a skiff roughly 104 nautical miles (NM) southwest of Brass Island. They boarded the Marshall Islands-flag tanker but the crew were able to muster in the citadel. No one was injured or kidnapped. The suspects remained on board for around four hours – a good indication of how long a citadel needs to withstand an attack. No Nigerian naval vessels responded.
The Curacao-flag reefer Orange Frost was attacked on the 30 May 71 NM northwest of Santo Antonion after departing Douala reportedly for Matadi in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Seven armed individuals boarded the vessels but most of the crew were able to muster in the citadel. However, one crew member was wounded and another allegedly kidnapped. After the attack, the Nigerian security escort vessel (SEV) Defender X came alongside and remained with the vessel until it departed.
The Spanish warship Relampago was present in the Gulf of Guinea at this time and had turned on its AIS the previous day as it transited westwards towards Dakar. So it is possible that the pirate action group (PAG) was tracking it and prepared to attack the Orange Frost after determining its heading.
To gauge the risk threat to specific vessels within the Gulf of Guinea, we apply key indicators and external factors.
Major indicator
- There is a known correlation between the oil price and piracy-related events; if the oil price drops below a certain threshold, typically USD 80 per barrel, this is likely to trigger an increase in events. If the oil price moves higher, it becomes more lucrative for the PAGs to steal oil from wellheads and refine it themselves.
- Currently, Operation Delta Sanity 2 is currently underway within the Gulf of Guinea. This was launched by the Nigerian Navy in January 2024 to prevent the theft, production and distribution of illicit crude-oil products by these groups. Between January and June, 79 crude-oil interdictions were carried out by the Nigerian Navy. However, the majority were low level, with little to no impact on the business model of the PAGs.
External factors
1) Bunkering (i.e. where has the vessel sourced its fuel?)
A prime example is the China-flag fishing vessel Mengxin 1 which was targeted offshore Ghana in March. Three crew members were kidnapped. The reason for the attack could be due to where the vessel got its fuel. The fishing company has a large fleet that routinely operates offshore Ghana and if the vessels are using fuel sourced from the outside of the Gulf, or from a PAG competitor within the Gulf, it is possible that this may be a reason as to why a ship may be targeted.
2) SEV engagement
We know this is a deterrent to the PAGs, however there are circumstances where SEV engagement may not be that effective. For example, if the SEV transits further than one NM away from the vessel that it is escorting, the vessel will be more exposed and the risk of attack increases. Secondly, if the SEV experiences mechanical/engine issues, the escorted vessel will be left exposed and vulnerable.
3) Presence of foreign naval vessels
The Spanish warship mentioned earlier was operating within the Gulf continuously in Q2. Again, it is possible that the PAGs are aware of the presence of foreign naval vessels which may explain gaps in attack deployment.
Gulf of Guinea ‘kidnap for ransom’ cycle
What happens when a crew member(s) has been kidnapped? The individual(s) is typically transferred to a skiff and taken to a PAG camp in the Niger Delta – where the complex river system allows PAGs to operate freely without fear of disruption. We believe most where hostages are held are close to an illegal refinery, in line with the presumed alternative business model (illicit refining of stolen crude) of the PAGs.
During captivity hostages can be exposed to diseases such as malaria, as well as malnourishment. They are typically held for 25 to 60 days while negotiations are underway. As these come to an end, it is likely that the overall risk in the Gulf may increase as the PAG prepares to carry out the next kidnap operation.
The main driver is financial gain, especially higher ransoms for foreign crew members.
There are two active PAGs operating in the Gulf, one in the west and one in the east, although there is no evidence that they are in connected. There has been an uptick of events in the east due to the lack of security infrastructure in that area, specifically Equatorial Guinea, which does not permit private SEVS nor is the Navy as strong as that of Nigeria. There are smaller PAGs operating within the Niger Delta who routinely target passenger vessels; these currently present no threat to merchant vessels calling at Port Harcourt.
The PAGs are opportunistic and will target a vessel based on the specifics including freeboard, speed and BMP, and whether there is an SEV in attendance – rather than specific types of vessel. Our freeboard baseline in the Gulf is 10.4 metres (the highest recorded freeboard of a ship boarded in West Africa). The PAGs can target vessels transiting at up to 20 knots and can operate up to 400 NM offshore. These baselines enable us to try to accurately predict the threat to a specific vessel during transit.
In terms of seasonality, historically there have been fewer pirate events during the wet season from May through October. This could be due to the migration of fishing vessels, which in the dry season operate further offshore. The PAGs may be supplying these vessels with fuel, which is more lucrative during the wet season hence fewer kidnapping events.
Humanitarian Mass Search & Rescue (HMSAR)
In the last two years Ambrey has recorded over 1,800 HMSAR-related events of which more than 700 resulted in business interruption – vessels diverted, searched or taken migrants on board. This spans the Mediterranean and Atlantic but Ambrey also monitors the Indian Ocean and Americas. These events collectively resulted in over 90,000 additional NM sailed (equivalent to 57 Atlantic crossings) and 180 days or six months spent in rescue operations. A container ship circumnavigation typically three to four months, so this represents a significant diversion of time and resources.
In one event earlier this year, 24 merchant vessels participated in a coordinated search for a group of people in distress that lasted over 60 hours – which highlights the willingness of merchant masters to render assistance often without hesitation.
Seasonality trend
Although the gap is starting to narrow, Ambrey data clearly shows that the high season for migration crossings is the April-September summer season. Migrants can travel further due to calmer sea states which increases the likelihood of a merchant vessel being tasked to conduct SAR operations. This results in longer SAR ranges and higher operational load, especially if a vessel carries out a rescue and is compelled to sail back to North Africa to disembark the group. The risks associated with on-boarding migrants also increase as there is a higher chance of encountering individuals in acute distress, suffering from dehydration, malnutrition, fatigue and other medical complications. So while summer may be better for navigation, the greater number of migrant crossings and complexity of S&R operations represent a greater challenge.
Strong focus on advocacy
Ambrey is a world leader in analysing and engaging stakeholders to recognise the critical role that merchant ships play in humanitarian rescue. We advocate for:
- Greater inclusion of the private sector in future policy development
- Better information sharing to enable better decision making that reflects the capability limitations of merchant vessels.
- That only legal and lawful orders are issued by MRCCs when tasking vessels.
- A safer operational environment for both the rescued and rescuers.
Escalation and emerging threats in the Black Sea
Following the temporary diplomatic pause initiated by the Riyadh agreements on 18 February between Russia, Ukraine and the US, active hostilities have now resumed. Russia has restarted strikes on Ukrainian port and maritime infrastructure, specifically targeting Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny. In response, Ukraine has renewed its attacks on Russian hydrocarbon infrastructure and key supply routes, including the Kerch Bridge.
One notable escalation is Ukraine’s use of non-linear warfare through Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) concealed within containerised cargo to strike airfields deep inside Russian territory. The weaponisation of containers could have serious implications for global container shipping. It may trigger increased scrutiny of containerised cargo – not only in the Black Sea, but more broadly – due to elevated perceptions of risk and concerns about containers as a potential vector for covert attacks.
There is also growing concern that Russia may again invoke allegations of weapons smuggling aboard merchant vessels carrying containers as a pretext for targeting commercial shipping bound for Ukraine. While such claims have been made previously, Ukraine’s recent use of UAVs from containerised platforms lends these accusations a degree of plausibility – raising the risk of escalation and increased hostility towards merchant vessels in the region.
In terms of emerging threats, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) now represent a relatively new and poorly understood risk to merchant traffic. Weaponised UUVs are suspected to have been involved in attacks on the Kerch Bridge. Russian port authorities are now urging vessels heading to or berthed in Russian ports to report any anomalies related to possible underwater threats.
From a security trend perspective, the unofficial ceasefire period saw a significant reduction in marsec incidents in both Russian and Ukrainian waters. However, incident levels in the first half of June have already matched the combined totals for all of May and April – indicating a sharp resurgence in risk.
Looking ahead, upcoming negotiations in Istanbul are unlikely to produce meaningful de-escalation. Merchant vessels will continue to face heightened threat levels throughout 2025 in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov – especially those calling at Ukrainian ports, with slightly lower risks for vessels calling in Russia.
While threat levels are significantly reduced for ships visiting Romanian and Bulgarian ports, the persistent danger of unexploded ordnance/sea mines remains present across the Black Sea.
Narcotics trends in South America
In 2025 alone, Ambrey recorded over 500 marsec events related to narcotics trafficking. These incidents occurred in every coastal nation of South America, as well as across the majority of Caribbean islands. Cocaine remains the most trafficked illicit substance globally, with much of it reaching Europe via merchant vessels. Panama, Colombia and Brazil recorded the highest number of seizures, while Ecuador led in terms of total volume seized.
There are notable regional differences in modus operandi. In Brazil, for example, many seizures involve underwater dive teams attaching cocaine to the hull or hiding it in the sea chest. In Panama, the dominant method is “rip-off/rip-on” where narcotics – typically in duffel bags – are placed in an open container before it is sealed and loaded. In Colombia, most cases involve cocaine inserted directly into the cargo prior to containers arriving at port, although sea chest concealment and rip-on/rip-off are also common. Ecuador follows a similar pattern, but cocaine is often mixed directly with banana cargos at the origin point. The Dominican Republic largely functions as a transit hub.
On the consumer side, container cargo stow remains the most common method. Cocaine is mixed with legitimate cargo – particularly fresh produce – allowing for multiple tons to be sent to Europe at a time. Motor compartments of containers are also frequently used, although volumes are smaller (typically under 100 kilograms per container) and pose higher legal risk for the master and crew, who could reasonably be suspected of complicity due to ease of access.
Some trafficking methods are particularly inventive. Authorities have discovered ceramic bananas filled with cocaine, as well as rubber pumpkins, tequila bottles, fruit juice containers, floor tiles and even yoga mats. While these methods may seem almost comical, they underscore the growing sophistication of narco-traffickers not only in Latin America, but also in Europe, where laboratory-level facilities are often needed to extract the admixed narcotics.
When calling at South American ports, vessels should adopt minimum preventative measures tailored to known trafficking techniques. Understanding the local smuggling modalities is crucial for implementing effective deterrence strategies. One key concern is whether law enforcement might reasonably suspect merchant crew of participating in smuggling operations, particularly when concealment methods allow easy access.
Ambrey can provide port assessments with a specific focus on narcotics risks, and advise on targeted preventative measures customised to each vessel and scheduled port call.
Global seaborne trade analysis
Clarksons Research projects a marginal decline of 0.1% in global trade for 2025. While this suggests a plateau, it is worth noting that over the past 20 years, global seaborne trade has grown steadily –from approximately 8 billion to 12.6 billion tonnes annually – so the overall trend remains resilient. However, there is considerable uncertainty. If pending tariff and trade agreements are swiftly finalised, we could see trade rise by up to 1%. If delayed, the downturn could deepen to around 2%. That said, trade typically adapts – when one market closes, another tends to open.
Outlook by shipping segment
- The oil trade is expected to grow steadily, with traders and charterers already factoring in geopolitical disruption, particularly in the Red Sea. Vessel traffic through the Suez Canal remains consistent, averaging 60-70 ships per day over the past 18 months.
- In dry bulk, the outlook is softer – particularly from China, which is currently holding high inventory levels after extensive stockpiling.
- The container trade is often the best indicator of global economic trends. Prior to the recent US tariff announcements, there was a sharp spike in container volumes bound for the US – a rush that has now levelled off. At the same time, tonne-miles continue to rise as more vessels reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, although this trend is expected to flatten in 2025, with only modest annual increases projected due to regional instability.
Port activity and shifting trade routes
Globally, port calls typically dip in February and March due to Lunar New Year slowdowns, before rebounding in April and May. However, March 2025 bucked this trend, with a spike in US port activity as businesses front-loaded imports ahead of new tariffs. This was mirrored by a surge in retail sales as consumers sought to beat anticipated price hikes.
April saw a sharp correction as markets normalised, followed by mixed patterns. Notably, a surge in container vessel departures from China during April and May was not reflected in corresponding US arrivals. The data suggests these ships are being redirected. Significant increases have been recorded in India, and to a lesser extent in Rotterdam and Japan, with limited growth into the UK. It appears China has already begun reconfiguring its trade flows in response to tightening US tariffs, actively targeting alternative markets.
Crew changes in the US
Regarding the recent US proclamation restricting entry of foreign nationals without visas, there have been no reported issues affecting crew changes – whether off-signing or on-signing – particularly in and around the Houston area.
Middle East Gulf situation and shipping risk
At present, the Middle East Gulf is seeing high concentrations of VLCCs, ULCCs and gas carriers, particularly around Basra, Ras Tahrir (Saudi Arabia), Fujairah and the Khor Fakkan Anchorage. Many of these vessels appear to be in ballast or awaiting instructions, likely monitoring developments in the Israel-Iran conflict before entering the Gulf. Should the situation escalate, Saudi Arabia may face disruption to oil exports, and Qatar to gas shipments.
From an operational standpoint, a full closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran is considered highly unlikely, even in the event of escalation. However, targeted disruption – particularly of US-affiliated oil cargoes – is anticipated. Iranian strategy is more likely to involve selective interference rather than indiscriminate action.
Spoofing and navigational disruptions
Significant GPS spoofing activity has been observed across the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Disruptions have been especially pronounced at anchorages in the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and northern Saudi Arabia. In most cases, vessel signals are redirected to locations off Iran, suggesting a defensive posture. Spoofing has extended to the western end of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), disrupting nearly all GPS signals in the area. Operators should plan for the possibility of extended GPS outages while transiting the region.
Naval escort and US posture
There are currently no confirmed plans for naval escorts through the Strait of Hormuz. While US naval forces have historically provided protection during periods of tension with Iran, it is unclear whether similar action will be taken now. US forces are repositioning further into the Arabian Sea, and any future escort or intervention will depend on the degree of escalation and whether the US becomes directly engaged.
Recommended vessel actions during escalation
If escalation occurs and a vessel is located west of the Strait of Hormuz, high-risk vessels (e.g. US-affiliated or, though less likely, Israeli-affiliated), if northwest of the Gulf should complete cargo operations and seek shelter near Saudi territorial waters to await clarity on the threat picture.
If the vessel is east of Qatar, move south toward the UAE, ideally staying out of main shipping lanes and anchoring or drifting within UAE territorial waters if possible.
Full closure of the Strait with indiscriminate targeting is not anticipated. However, if risk of collateral damage increases, non-affiliated ships may choose to exit the Gulf as a precautionary measure.
Operators should also consider historical vessel affiliations. In previous incidents, outdated ownership or registry information has been used to justify targeting. Ambrey’s asset screening assessments analyse both public and proprietary data sources to provide a comprehensive view of vessel affiliations – past and present – to support better risk awareness and voyage planning.
Outlook and planning considerations
There is currently no direct or credible threat to tankers. However, escalation can occur rapidly – well within the timeframe of a typical Gulf transit. Once a vessel is inside the Gulf or Strait, the conflict environment could deteriorate faster than a ship can safely exit. This makes forward planning essential. Risk should be assessed not only on current exposure but on the speed at which conditions can change.
If Iranian intent shifts toward targeting merchant shipping, the number of directly impacted vessels may remain small, but the commercial disruption could be significant. Charterers and operators – just as seen recently in the Red Sea – may suspend operations until conditions are deemed safe again.
Houthi threat dynamics
The Houthi leadership has threatened to target US military facilities in the region should the US become directly involved in the conflict between Israel and Iran. This threat could also extend to merchant shipping, particularly US-flag vessels. While the Houthis have not targeted merchant vessels since the end of last year, their stated focus remains on Israeli-linked shipping. However, with little to no Israeli commercial presence in the area, the extent of their willingness to strike broader commercial targets remains unproven.
Importantly, the Houthis have demonstrated an expanded operational reach, now capable of launching attacks well into the Arabian Sea. Previously, their success was largely confined to within Yemen’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), east of Socotra. This expanded range intersects with Iran’s use of Armand drones, which have also been deployed against merchant vessels, reinforcing the link between Houthi capabilities and broader Iranian strategies.
Despite this reach, the primary area of concern remains the Gulf itself – particularly the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman – where most historical activity has taken place. These chokepoints are where defensive measures by regional and international military forces will be most severely tested, given the extremely limited response time in the event of an attack. Offshore assets, including data infrastructure and installations near Iranian waters, also remain exposed.
While the risk to the wider Indian Ocean is currently assessed as limited, especially if US strikes degrade Iranian capabilities, the greatest threat continues to centre on the strategically vital straits and surrounding areas.
Somali piracy
There have been no signs of an increase in PAG-related incidents in the past quarter. We are now in the monsoon season, which has historically always pushed piracy activity closer to the shorelines, but activity was already rather reduced. The occasional fishing vessel has been hijacked but this has not translated into an ostensible threat to merchant shipping offshore.